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Abstract 
For many people the expression “applied ethics” sounds like a pleonasm. They 
tend to claim that ethics by its very nature is about practical matters. It deals with 
human actions and their motivations and there is no need to create an additional 
discipline with special practical bias. However, at least since the 1970s, there has 
been a growing movement of applied ethics which resulted not only in the in-
crease of enrolment to the academic courses but also in the demand for consulting 
services in this field. And yet the question still remains to what extent applied 
ethics inherits philosophical tradition and style of thinking. The aim of this paper 
is to demonstrate that the applied ethics is a continuation of philosophical inquiry 
in the way adjusted well to the demands of the pluralistic and democratic societies. 
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1. Introductory remarks
When I first heard about “practical ethics” (another term for “applied ethics”), the 
phrase sounded more like a pleonasm. After all, the field of ethics has always been 
about practical matters since its norms deal with the ways people behave and they 
regulate the choices of people, while the application of a specific norm is based on 
the “work” of practical reason. Many years have passed since then and today, I am 
ready to support the claim that the idea of applied ethics is a valid ethical reflec-
tion. The word “ethics” should be emphasized here as it is specifically about ethi-
cal reflection, and not about any reflection that uses the word in its name but has 
hardly anything to do with ethics. For example, an “ethics committee” can be in 
reality about control, dispute resolution or regulatory functions within an organi-
zation. 
In fact, the word “ethics” is frequently understood as a set of rules governing 
quite simple and not necessarily ethical activities of a public official or a civil 
servant. It is a common knowledge that an official should not accept gifts from an 
inquirer, especially gifts whose value would indicate specific intentions of the one 
who offers them. However, if officials succumb to these temptations, a workplace 
and a point of contact with a customer could be designed in a way that prevents 
the secret exchange of anything and ensures the supervision of third parties, in-
cluding other customers who are waiting to be served. 
In the face of such a use of the word “ethics,” it is hardly surprising that phi-
losophers underline the fact that ethics is already practical in nature, i.e. it refers to 
human actions, and if we put a lot of emphasis upon its applicability, it may raise 
suspicions that it is not about applying or following, but about adapting or “bend-
ing” ethical principles to current needs and for other unspecified purposes.  
And so, one may wonder: Who is right—a philosopher or a practical ethicist? 
The following deliberations will be devoted to answering this very question. 
2. Ethics and morality
To give an account of the doubts about the possibility of “applying ethics,” one 
must shift away from the common identification of ethics with morality or even 
deny it (in everyday life, “ethical” and “moral” are given the same meaning, just 
like “unethical” and “immoral,” and “morality” and “ethics”). Both disciplines 
seek to answer the most important questions that can appear in our life: How to 
live and what should be done. Yet, the field of ethics lacks narrow perspectives 
of morality (Annas, 1992, p. 329). It is not somebody’s way of thinking or 
a worldview, but an impersonal project of human obligations, in the scope of 
which a definite distinction between good and evil is made. Morality, on the other 
hand, is about the principles that an individual adopts from a group and later con-
siders them his or her own. Ethics is an ideal standard, whereas morality corre-
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sponds to specific principles of particular people and groups. Ethics is universally 
applicable, whether a given community complies with it or not. No opinion poll 
can validate or refute it. Morality can go wrong, ethics—never (Hausman 
& McPherson, 1996, p. 4; cf. Hołówka, 1996, pp. xiii–xiv).  
If someone acts in a certain way and it is a routine action, this person can be 
subject to moral judgments of other people (or his or her own) only from the per-
spective of time. Nevertheless, if before undertaking an action this person asks 
himself or herself what I should do, or whether I should do what others tell me to 
do, this question is believed to be of a special kind as it reveals to us the nature of 
ethics. The question is not what others would do being in my shoes. Public opin-
ion polls are useless since the real question is whether I should do it. My reasoning 
must become a kind of independent argumentation, grounded in the belief that 
some answers are more righteous and more adequate than others and there is al-
ways a possibility of arriving at better answers. It would be irrational to give up on 
something that is more righteous and choose less-righteous actions. Therefore, 
I assume the rational nature of these questions and of all moral argumentation in 
general (Hausman & McPherson, 1996, p. 5). 
This conversation with yourself constitutes a form of dialogue in which dif-
ferent points of view are considered and other people are, as it were, represented, 
and we ourselves try to grasp other people’s perspectives as well as to see the 
potential effects of our actions on others.
1
 But if it boils down to the question 
“what are people going to say?” the ethical character of this internal argument is 
lost and it turns into developing a strategy of adapting to the expectations of oth-
ers. It could be compared to marketers’ purpose in doing polls. Ethics, however, 
does not consist in providing other people with what they want. 
One can obviously claim that such an argumentation is a purely philosophical 
invention since people act in a routine manner and there is no room for seeking the 
right path. Yet, the fact that people most often act basing on the collectively 
shared social norm does not dismiss the possibility of real ethical argumentation. 
In truly complex matters, the routine fails or even does not exist. Hausman and 
McPherson put forward an example of a female student who is considering the 
termination of her pregnancy. It is not a question of legality: the fact that abortion 
is legal does not mean that it should be done by her without further deliberations. 
It is not a matter of support for abortion expressed in percentage, which can be 
read in various surveys. It is she who must overcome her own doubts. And her 
doubts are a testimony to various arguments that she is considering—and thus, she 
gets involved in an ethical argumentation with herself (Hausman & McPherson, 
1996, p. 4). 
The social nature of these considerations stems also from the fact that the ar-
guments that we invoke during a conversation with ourselves were most often 
already presented by other people in the past and, moreover, they fall into place. If 
the girl studied philosophy, she would probably be able to attribute them to partic-
1 In reference to G.H. Mead and M. Bachtin, the dialogical character of human life was discussed by 
Charles Taylor (2003, originally published in 1991 under the title “The Malaise of Modernity”). 
Cf. Werhane, 1999, p. 38. 
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ular ethical theories (but this skill is not, in any way, the prerequisite for engaging 
in an internal dialogue). In an attempt to support our judgments, we always refer 
(usually implicitly) to a more universal theory. If our judgment were to do with 
people’s actions, these theories would be of ethical and normative character. Cit-
ing these is neither accidental nor random. It is not an ordinary “reference” or so-
called theorizing either (her dilemmas are not theoretical considerations over the 
planned content of her master’s thesis), but it is rather about advocating them. 
According to Stephen Darwall, it is committing ourselves to the existence of cer-
tain theories that were not fully recalled but which provide justification whenever 
we form an ethical judgment. 
This is because of an important feature of ethical concepts and properties that we 
might call their reason- or warrant-dependence. When, for example, I judge that 
something is good, I say, not just that I value it, but that there is reason to value 
it—that valuing it is warranted, an attitude one ought to have. As a logical mat-
ter, however, this can be true only if something has other properties: the reasons 
for valuing it. And such reasons cannot simply consist in the property that it is 
good, since that is itself the property of there being such reasons. Unlike, say, 
the property of yellowness, which might attach to something all by itself, as it 
were, ethical properties require, by their very nature, completion by further 
properties that are their reasons or grounds. (Darwall, 2003, pp. 18–19) 
Hence, each ethical valuation means committing oneself to the normative 
structure of thought, which allows to associate certain life events with specific 
values in a permanent way, provided specific conditions are met. Ethical consider-
ation cannot do without normative structures. The quality of our reasoning reflects 
the quality of the theory that we—willingly or not—refer to (Darwall, 2003, 
p. 18).
Morality is concrete in the sense that it is attributed to specific groups of peo-
ple—these people and not the others act in this particular way. Ethics is abstract 
because it is detached from the actions of people around us. In this way, ethics can 
contradict morality. 
3. Can ethics be applied?
As stated above, ethical argumentation coincides with the life dilemmas, meaning 
it takes place in practical and specific circumstances, and thus we can speak of 
“applying” certain concepts. However, the idea of applied ethics is not only about 
the literal meaning of the term “apply.” It is about something more. For this rea-
son, philosophers are concerned that—as already mentioned—behind the applica-
tion lies the “adjustment” of arguments to the requirements of the moment, which 
is something that runs against the nature of the argumentation that would be ra-
tional and detached from all the pressures of life. 
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I believe such concerns are unfounded. It can even be argued that the move-
ment of applied ethics emerged due to the weakness of ethics itself, among other 
things, since there is no single normative structure that would allow people to 
methodically arrive at the best decisions. Different normative ethics created 
throughout the history offer different recommendations. Traditionally, utilitarian-
ism and Kantism are mentioned as two sources of opposing recommendations. But 
real life needs possibly unambiguous decisions. It is mostly not about extremely 
dramatic choices. The discussions about unemployed foreigners in the United 
Kingdom (staying there and seeking work legally, as it is the case of Poles) may 
serve as an example. The authorities of London made a pledge that if foreigners 
decide to return home, they will have expenses covered. The officials must have 
been caught in a dilemma, wondering about the ethical side of this procedure: 
wouldn’t it be a restriction of their freedom to make these people leave (the legal 
right to work also implies “the right to fail” or having no job); is it proper to do it 
with the money of a British taxpayer? The latter argument can be refuted with 
another: if they stayed in London, wouldn’t they succumb to the temptations of the 
underworld and wouldn’t a British taxpayer incur more expenses due to possible 
crimes and legal processes than 50 pounds for their bus home? 
The rivalry between normative ethics means that some kind of relativism
appears in the discussions. Since representatives of different schools formulate 
different recommendations from their ethical systems, we deal with a multitude 
of perspectives, which contradicts the rational ideals of ethics. (Unless the ideal of 
rationality is placed at the level of discussion, and not of final principles).
Ethics, in this way, becomes “somebody’s” and starts to resemble morality. And 
yet, the idea and the ideal of impartial moral arbitration are still present in the 
philosophy and thoughts of many people. Numerous philosophical works have 
been de-voted to this ideal, for example, the qualified attitude method of Richard 
Brandt (1959, pp. 244–252) or the idea of the original position of John Rawls 
(1971, pp. 17–21). 
This begs further questions: is it necessary to build yet another system of 
normative ethics? Is it to be built by one person or many people? Is it supposed to 
be a finished work, or should it take the form of principles that are set in an open 
discussion? The formulation of ethical norms is always based on certain premises 
and they can be of diverse nature. Thus, the validity of what is formed should be 
controlled at all stages. And again, should it be done by one person in a single 
treaty, or by participants in a discussion? In fact, philosophers have already at-
tempted to build systems of normative ethics aspiring to be a comprehensive, 
coherent and universal set of beliefs, but eventually, they solely enriched a sort of 
repertoire of arguments and justifications that is still being used by ethicists and 
everyone interested in the ethical argumentation.
2
 Significant treaties are rare 
(Brandt’s in 1959, Rawls’ in 1971, Habermas’ in 1984–1989), but debates on 
2 About completeness, consistency and generality of normative ethical proposals, cf. Brandt (1959, 
pp. 7, 16–26). It was Alasdair MacIntyre (1998, p. 199) who wrote about “the impossibility of funda-
mental innovation” in ethics after Hegel.  
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ethics are more and more frequent and, so to speak, increasingly public and demo-
cratic. Even though they will not result in the creation of one system of normative 
ethics, it cannot be avoided that people constantly recall ethical arguments. 
The debate over emerging practical issues has resulted in the creation of sev-
eral applied ethical principles. Hence, we are not left with the choice only between 
nihilism or naive relativism (everyone has their own morality) and usurpation (my 
system and my reasoning have universal value). It is manifested in the creation of 
the so-called applied ethics (practical ethics)—the reflection that was brought to 
life as a result of practical problems. Tom L. Beauchamp enumerates types of such 
problems: abortion, euthanasia, the protection of human and animal subjects in 
scientific research, racism, sexism, affirmative action, the acceptable risk in the 
workplace, the legal enforcement of ethical norms, civil disobedience, unjust wars 
and the private data protection (2003, p. 1). The list of these topics is much longer 
and still open. And although since ancient times philosophers pondered on similar 
issues (of course, within their cognitive horizon—they had no idea about cloning, 
but they already knew a lot about wars), the term “applied ethics” came into use in 
the 1970s. 
Still, it is not known whether applied ethics was created as a result of consid-
ering philosophical issues that were being proposed by philosophers over the cen-
turies, as it is sometimes said. Most probably, it owes its existence to the issues 
addressed by representatives of various professions, activists of various organiza-
tions, journalists and ordinary citizens, who were united in the protest against the 
shocking phenomena of the modern world regarding, for instance, women’s rights, 
consumers’ safety, environmental protection, treatment of prisoners, use of ani-
mals in medical research, etc. Thus, the unrest that sparked the movement of ap-
plied ethics was preoccupying both, philosophers and non-philosophers in an 
equal degree. 
 “At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s the student 
movement and the New Left challenged the established society. There were heated 
discussions over topics such as the Vietnam War, social injustice, poverty in the 
third world, inequality between men and women and the maltreatment of animals. 
Many philosophers were engaged in the discussions. From this perspective the rise 
of applied ethics can be seen as a philosophical response to a new social situation” 
(Collste, 2007, pp. 24–25; cf. Singer, 2006, pp. 3–4). 
Philosophers are inclined to believe that applied ethics is about applying gen-
eral theories to solve practical problems. But how to apply the Kantian principle of 
treating others not just as a means to an end but also as an end in itself in 
a situation which takes place in an organization that must adhere to strict security 
measures and absolute hierarchical subordination? We would need concrete in-
stances of situations in which the problem arises as well as the knowledge about 
the organization itself, its history, current mission and the patterns of excellence in 
this organizational context (Beauchamp, 2003, p. 2). 
Therefore, it would be more convenient to assume that applied ethics consists 
in making any use of philosophical concepts to deal with the problems that occur 
within the scope of various professions and relate to their characteristics, and 
especially those caused by the development of technology and the possibilities it 
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offers today (Beauchamp, 2003, p. 3). At this point, one may voice serious doubts. 
Because it is not about “any” use, but about practical solutions to certain issues. 
The emphasis should not be put on referring to philosophical concepts, but on 
producing practical outcomes.  
Let us adopt the possibly most general description of applied ethics as a re-
flection that is about the implementation of philosophical accomplishments to 
resolve practical matters, keeping in mind how things work in practice, without 
the sense of superiority of a philosopher who “knows better,” yet with the aware-
ness that this type of ethics always goes beyond its own limitations and resorts to 
higher reasons. Certainly, such a description is far from perfect. The most im-
portant thing, however, is that nowadays no one questions that applied ethics ex-
ists or whether it is necessary. One researcher asserts that the contemporary ethical 
reflection is dominated by, on the one hand, applied ethics and, on the other hand, 
by “theoretical considerations explaining or justifying (as well as criticizing) one 
of the highest principles of the practical sphere” (Kaniowski, 1999, pp. 6–7). He 
lists, among others, Apel’s and Habermas’ discourse principle, Rawls’ principle of 
justice and the utilitarian principle of utility. As mentioned before, their existence 
makes it possible for applied ethics to go beyond its own limits in search of the 
validation of its judgments.  
4. Philosophical characteristics of applied ethics
Applied ethics has some important features that I would like to present. These 
correspond to (often implicitly) certain philosophical traditions (the first one can 
be associated with the thesis about “the end of philosophy”), and I shall point to 
them as well. Moreover, I would like to note that it also concerns business ethics, 
one of the branches of applied ethics that I am personally most interested in. Busi-
ness ethics is one of the most dynamically developing disciplines for two reasons: 
the central role of the economy in developed countries and the attention given to 
its impact on a consumer, along with the influence it has on the media, mass cul-
ture and the people’s lifestyle. 
4.1. The role of practical necessities 
Applied ethics is not the reflection monopolized by philosophers, but it is availa-
ble to anyone interested in the subject matter. First of all, it concerns the practi-
tioners (doctors, researchers, entrepreneurs) as they are struggling with problems 
that are not easily resolved. Then, there are stakeholders of the activity who are 
controlling the course of action because they are, directly or indirectly, affected by 
its outcomes (e.g. journalists or human rights activists who consider themselves 
directly threatened). 
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Peter Singer in Practical Ethics (1999, p. 2) maintains: “ethics is not an ideal 
system that is noble in theory but no good in practice. The reverse of this is closer 
to the truth: an ethical judgment that is no good in practice must suffer from 
a theoretical defect as well, for the whole point of ethical judgments is to guide 
practice.”3 
Even if philosophical arguments are used, the very concept of a philosopher 
being the specialist in ethics does not imply his or her privilege in any form. 
A philosopher is simply a person who is able to navigate through certain traditions 
of thought more effectively, and for this reason, his or her help is very useful and 
sometimes even indispensable. Still, all of this happens on equal terms like in, for 
instance, discussions on media ethics, in which practical experience and fine repu-
tation matter more than the knowledge of ethical concepts. 
4.2. Openness to new facts 
Applied ethics is open to learning new facts. If the basis of the entire applied eth-
ics movement was formed by, for example, new possibilities of technology and 
medicine that allow for various genetic manipulations, the contemporary reflection 
on the righteousness (in the ethical sense) of certain activities cannot be oblivious 
to the results of new research and new practical possibilities in this field. In my 
opinion, the moral evaluation of interference in man’s innate genetic code cannot 
disregard the emerging facts and dependencies, because the effects they produce 
might eliminate the negative consequences of previous interference in nature, 
expand our knowledge on the subject, or shed light on events from the past. 
Historically, the new possibilities emerging in the medical sciences not only 
created an opportunity for ethical reflection, but were also a chance for its revival. 
Göran Collste recalls the well-known statement of Stephen Toulmin who was to 
say that “medicine saved the life of ethics.” It is worth quoting Collste (2007, 
pp. 23–24) in this context. “In the 1960s ethics was in decline. Most moral philos-
ophers worked with conceptual and epistemological questions. Not many were 
engaged in normative ethics and even fewer bothered to analyse moral problem in 
the real world. As a consequence academic ethics was by many considered as one 
of those peculiar philosophical subjects. In the beginning of the 1970s the situa-
tion changed.”4 
The openness to new facts and the necessity to take all circumstances into ac-
count is what makes applied ethics, in a way, situational and contextual. It does 
not necessarily indicate any relationship with situation ethics in the understanding 
of the Christian thought after the Second World War. Nevertheless, pursuant to the 
principle circumstances alter cases, the situational element in applied ethics is 
always present and must be acknowledged (Gustafson, 1992, p. 1153). Another 
issue is the emerging problem of ethical naturalism, the influence that facts have 
on values (on which I will not be able to elaborate here); yet, with this understand-
3 First published in 1979, Singer’s Practical Ethics has become a classic introduction to applied ethics. 
4 The author also points to the ground-breaking character of the work by Beauchamp and Childress 
(1977). 
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ing of ethics, the allegation of naturalism loses its strength, because—like in 
pragmatism—a certain kind of relationship between facts and values is assumed, 
which results from the growing appreciation of the practical side (cf. for example 
Kurtz, 1990, p. 33 et seqq.). 
4.3. Modern casuistry 
Applied ethics is casuistic, but in a good way. In essence, the point is to always 
consider given circumstances and not to apply the “rigid” rules automatically. 
Various ethical concepts are usually being combined since practice is character-
ized by “different” type of complexity than the theory. It would be difficult to act 
on the basis of just one complete theory of good and evil (Bedau, 1992, p. 127). 
The casuistic character of business ethics is also manifested in, for instance, the 
frequent use of cases in didactics. It is due to a conviction that thanks to case stud-
ies we learn how to solve practical dilemmas, along with all the richness and am-
biguity of specific situations. Frequently, students deal with real events and have 
a chance to compare their own solutions with what occurred in reality. This way, 
they learn to make the right decisions (Beauchamp & Bowie, 1988, p. 50). 
The casuistic method of course involves some level of risk. Immersing one-
self in the situation can dull one’s moral sensitivity, while the excess of detail can 
lead to the lack of judgment or even of action. What is more, situationism or con-
textualism can make it easier to validate dubious solutions, which was brought to 
attention by Aniela Dylus (1997, p. 73 et seqq.). I believe that bad-faith specula-
tions can happen any time, yet applied ethics, and especially business ethics, are 
destined for a bottom-up ordering in its analysis—from concrete to abstract. Per-
haps we should recognize “new casuistry” that emerged in the 1970s together with 
business ethics (in legal sciences and law teaching—even earlier) and whose in-
tentions were and are very ambitious. It is not just about studying cases that reflect 
the real complexity of the situation, so as to accustom students to the ambiguity 
that awaits them in their “real” life. It is about something more. As Richard 
B. Miller (1996, p. 7) writes, “I hope to strengthen our appreciation of casuistry by 
using its tools to address a variety of debates in our public and intellectual life—
debates about war, politics, sexuality, medicine, women in society, and the study 
of religion.”  
4.4. Social nature of applied ethics 
Miller, quoted above, mentioned the debates in public life about the topics which 
could be easily found in textbooks on applied ethics. In this sense applied ethics is 
of social nature since it addresses the questions crucial for a peaceful coexistence 
of individuals in a public sphere. It is also a relatively new phenomenon which 
was recognized as a separate field in the 1970s. Applied ethics belongs to the
third stage of the development of modern moral philosophy, according to 
J. B. Schneewind who has commented on the history of moral thought and divided 
the whole process into three periods. The first stage represents the historical tran-
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sition from the understanding of morality as something designed and decreed 
independently on human valuations to an idea that morality was part and parcel of 
human nature and a crucial evidence of human autonomy. Historically the begin-
ning of this period was marked by the publication of the Montaigne’s Essays to-
ward the end of the 16
th
 century and its most prominent works by Kant, Reid and 
Bentham became available at the end of the 18
th
 century. The second stage, which 
lasted until the 1960s–1970s, offered a further elaboration of the picture of an 
individual as the self-governing being. During the third stage “the attention of 
moral philosophers has begun to shift away from the problem of the autonomous 
individual toward new issues concerning public morality” (Schneewind, 2000, 
pp. 147–158). 
At first sight, this claim may sound like a rejection of the so-called Enlight-
enment project or like a criticism of today’s urban, anonymous, pluralistic socie-
ties. It is true that a revival of the virtue ethics, mostly due to the intellectual ef-
forts of Alasdair MacIntyre, is a conspicuous stance in today’s public debates. 
Applied ethics however has nothing to do with a communitarian proposal to return 
to the pre-modern sense of unity based on common moral life and teleological 
understanding of human nature. On the contrary, it is based on a liberal picture of 
human nature but at the same time tries to solve the problems generated within 
a society composed of self-interested individuals. When I say that applied ethics is 
of social character, I mean that it deals less with the problems of moral autonomy 
of an isolated individual (although it has already embraced that liberal picture of 
a human being), and more with the issues that arise from cooperation between 
individuals within a public sphere, from specialized functions of members of pro-
fessions characterized by their self-imposed duties or from ambitions of quasi-
professions aspiring to a social role of special importance (e.g. managers embrac-
ing the doctrine of corporate social responsibility). 
The problem of cooperation and of public goods is always linked with the 
phenomenon of defection in the game-theoretic sense, free-riding and the so-
called social traps. This is a consequence of the atomization or individualistic 
nature of modern Western societies and the resulting challenge which can be 
summarized by a question: how to achieve unforced, voluntary cooperation of 
self-centered individuals, in other words—a spontaneous cooperation to mutual 
advantage. 
4.5. The significance of rhetoric 
Applied ethics is linked to a particular type of “application.” In a social situation, 
i.e. with the involvement or entanglement of many parties and a frequent conflict 
of interest, it is impossible to automatically apply certain general rules (as if fol-
lowing a recipe). Even within a hierarchically-structured organization, individuals 
cannot be treated completely instrumentally. Therefore, the search for solutions 
involves having debates, convincing others, seeking best possible paths together. 
The “application” of general rules in a pluralistic world consists in putting forward 
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arguments, justifying the choice of given concepts. The choices made in solitude 
are also of such a dialogical character, just as the identity of an individual: various 
reasons might be colliding in an individual conscience as well. 
And then, it should not come as a surprise that in the past casuistry was asso-
ciated with teaching and using rhetoric, making arguments and counterarguments, 
perfecting the art of persuasion (Bedau, 1992, p. 127). It is particularly evident in 
the field of law. In the 20
th
 century, Hans Blumenberg was defending the validity 
of rhetoric. Without going into much detail about his concept, we may say that he 
stressed the fact that when it comes to discussing morality, the definite evidence is 
not possible. Definite certainty does not exist either. If so, we can only produce 
arguments and try to convince others of the righteousness of our claims. Rhetoric 
is not something inferior to philosophy (including moral philosophy), as the latter 
does not grant us access to the absolute truth anymore (an even if it did, nowadays 
it would be, as a matter of fact, an instance of certain argumentation and persua-
sion) Rhetoric is not something one can choose instead of a simple proof that 
makes us believe we uncover the truth. It gains in importance because the absolute 
certainty is not possible. That is why the contemporary philosophy has no reason 
to reject the consensus (Blumenberg, 1987, p. 436). 
4.6. Values are created in practice 
In reality, applied ethics does not bring something ethereal back down to earth. It 
rather specifies something that, in the past, came out in practice. Stephen Darwall 
argues that applied ethics is not as “applied” as the term would suggest. Mathe-
matical theories are produced independently of experience and only later are “ap-
plied” to solve practical problems. Ethical theories are developed during the pro-
cess of reflection on the surrounding world, which is full of surprising and 
intriguing events. It means that practical dilemmas provide a context within which 
normative concepts are formulated (Darwall, 2003, p. 18). 
Hence, applying ethics involves, in fact, “applying” the concepts that grew 
out of their past use, which means referencing to past events and their past inter-
pretations, through—it should be stressed—the hermeneutic work. These ideas 
also exist in the American pragmatism, as exemplified by the views of Richard 
Rorty on going back to past valuations and applying these in new situations, in-
spired by John Dewey’s work. It is not so much about referring to the so-called 
existing values, as about “extracting” them from previous contexts and reading 
them in the light of new circumstances.  
The pragmatist view of what opponents of pragmatism call “firm moral principles” 
is that such principles are abbreviations of past practices—ways of summing up 
the habits of the ancestors whom we most admire. For example, Mill’s greater-
happiness principle and Kant’s categorical imperative are ways of reminding 
ourselves of certain social customs: those of certain part of the Christian West, 
parts of the culture which has been, at least in words if not in deeds, more egali-
tarian than any other. The Christian doctrine that all members of the species are 
brothers and sisters is the religious way of saying what Mill and Kant said in 
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secular terms: that considerations of family membership, sex, race, religious 
creed, and the like should not prevent us from trying to do unto others as we 
would have them do to us—should not prevent us from thinking of them 
as people like ourselves, deserving the respect which we ourselves hope to en-
joy. (Rorty, 1996, pp. 44–45) 
It is not a coincidence that certain issues and certain names still reappear as 
part of meta-ethical reflections on applied ethics (e.g. John Dewey). Pragmatism, 
which blurs the line between theory and practice, facts and values, ethics and 
meta-ethics, is said to be the seed from which applied ethics grew, and for a rea-
son (Putnam, 1992, p. 1005). Thus, the above-mentioned features of applied ethics 
form a whole: situationism, casuistry, rhetoric, ethical concepts rooted in practice, 
their reinterpretation while solving moral dilemmas, a democratic way of achiev-
ing a consensus.  
5. Conclusions
If there was just one ethical system in force, applying it would not be necessary. It 
would include the mechanism of automatic application: people brought up in 
a culture in which values are not put into question and are precisely specified 
would not have a problem answering to doubts like “how should I act?” Everyone 
faced with the same situation would come up with the same answer. But clearly, 
that is not the case in the modern world. Moral argumentation refers to different 
normative systems and the recommendations derived from them may differ. On 
a day to day basis, it is not that important because people are able to use their 
practical wisdom, as described by Aristotle. From time to time, however, the reali-
ty surprises them. Someone may make a claim that, for instance, it is immoral not 
to sort the waste. The surprise of the majority often sparks a public debate and 
a gradual change of daily habits. In a similar manner, people used to be confused 
when animal rights activist expressed their concern about the fate of mice that had 
been customarily subjected to numerous scientific experiments. 
From the point of view of social sciences, pluralization of contemporary so-
cieties is a fact, while the phenomenon of questioning the views that we got accus-
tomed to over the years is a common thing. The absolute and certainty disap-
peared. What remains is the discussion and negotiation on specific solutions. 
It can be also claimed that pluralism does not kill the moral sense, but on the con-
trary—opportunities to reflect critically on one’s own values can sharpen this 
sense. Rather it is a fixed, traditional conceptual framework which may dismiss 
ethics as a reflection based on dialogue and the necessity to justify the validity of 
one’s own arguments. 
And therefore, there is no reduction of ethics to morality, of abstract and im-
personal reasons to the ways of living of particular communities. Owing to de-
mocratization and debate, there is a need to go beyond widely held social norms 
and justify our own reasons. In a pluralistic world, argumentation becomes a ne-
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cessity of life. Morality remains in the sphere of everyday choices; ethics is about 
going beyond a daily routine. The more problematic the world grows, the more 
problematic Lebenswelt becomes. Discussions within the framework of applied 
ethics, including the ethics of press, television and online journalism, reveal that 
people are in need of ethical considerations. Professionals in their field need to 
bear the pressure of public opinion and want to know how they should act. Doc-
tors ask if they have the right to refuse a procedure which is condemned by part of 
society, and scientists—whether there is a limit to medical experiments and scien-
tific research. 
Today’s public debates and discussions within communities show that the 
application of ethics is not an ad hoc adaptation, nor simple bending the rules. It 
does not degrade philosophy but rather makes it an indispensable element of dem-
ocratic order. If I were to respond to the question from the beginning of this arti-
cle: “Who is right—a philosopher or practical ethicist?”, I would have to admit 
that the question is no longer valid. After all, practical or applied ethics is a mode 
of existence of philosophy in the world full of developments which even philoso-
phers have never expected, but, first of all, in the world of many urgent human 
problems that need to be addressed. 
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